Ecological Tax Reform by Costanza, Robert et al.
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Institute for Sustainable Solutions Publications and
Presentations Institute for Sustainable Solutions
3-1-1998
Ecological Tax Reform
Robert Costanza
Portland State University
Steve Bernow
Herman E. Daly
Robert DeGennaro
Paul Hawken
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/iss_pub
Part of the Sustainability Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Institute for Sustainable Solutions Publications and
Presentations by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bernow, S., R. Costanza, H. Daly, R. DeGennaro, D. Erlandson, D. Ferris, P. Hawken, J. A. Horner, J. Lancelot, T. Marx, D. Norland, I.
Peters, D. Roodman, C. Schneider, P. Shyamsundar, and J. Woodwell. 1998. Ecological tax reform. BioScience 48:193-196.
Society News
Ecological tax reform
Agrowing international trendis for governments to shifttbe burden of taxation away
from productive activities and onto
pollutants. This trend is rooted in
the recognition that taxes not only
raise necessary revenue for govern-
ments, but also discourage the taxed
activity. When levied on productive
activities, taxes place an extra burden
on the economy, whereas when levied
on pollution, taxes help to control it.
These principles are simple and pow-
erful, but they come with a suite of
ancillary issues, including concerns
about fairness, economic efficiency,
jobs, and disruption during the period
of transition to the new taxes.
Recent proposals for tax reform in
the United States have centered on the
relative merits of taxes on labor, capi-
tal, wealth, and consumption. But all
of these tax bases stem from generally
constructive activities, which the pro-
posed taxes penalize and discourage.
For example, taxing labor income tends
to discourage employment by making
labor more expensive to employers
and employment less profitable for
workers.
At the same time, the United States
faces costly problems of environmen-
tal pollution and natural resource
depletion at local, national, and glo-
bal scales. The methods of addressing
these problems have often involved
regulations tbat are sometimes ineffi-
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This article originated in a work-
shop on ecological tax reform held
18-19March 1996 in College Park,
MD. The workshop was organized
by the International Society for
Ecological Economics and sup-
ported by a grant from The Jobn
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation.
cient, as well as direct government
expenditures of tax dollars. The
United States also faces the threat of
losing jobs in traditional manufac-
turing sectors due to technological
change and increasing international
competition, especially from coun-
tries with low production costs.
Many Americans have also experi-
enced a trend of declining wages,
and disparities in income between
rich and poor have increased.
Alternative taxes that shift the bur-
den of taxation away from the useful
products of the economy and onto
undesirable byproducts have been pro-
posed by numerous authors (Kauf-
mann 1991, Agostini et al. 1992,
Repetto et al. 1992, Von Weizsacker
andjesinghaus 1992, Anderson 1993,
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 1993, Kohn
1993, Nordhaus 1993, Repetto et al.
1993, Oates 1994, Goulder 1995,
Hammond et al. 1997, Repetto and
Austin 1997). Such "ecological" tax
reform has the potential to ease both
the burden of taxation on parts of the
economy and the burden of the
economy on the environment. Given
the potential benefits of such a tax
shift, we believe tbat it deserves seri-
ous consideration as an alternative to
the current tax structure.
In this article, we have incorpo-
rated input from a broad cross-section
of interests to develop tbe general out-
line of a nearly revenue neutral eco-
logical tax reform package that would
shift some of the burden of taxation
away from economic "goods" and
onto economic and ecological "bads."
Our intention is to stimulate further
discussion and refinement of the ideas.
The policy guidelines we outline are
designed to serve multiple objectives,
including reducing pollution, improv-
ing the cost-effectiveness of pollution
control, creating jobs, boosting wages,
and preserving or increasing the
progressivity of the tax structure.
Historical perspective
The argument that polluters should
pay for the damage they inflict dates
back at least to the 1920 writings of
the economist Arthur C. Pigou. Pigou
argued that a pollution tax should be
set such that an increment of pollution
would incur a tax that is equal to the
costs that the pollution imposes on
others, including costs to health, prop-
erty, and the environment (Pigou
1920). Requiring individual polluters
to pay for the economic costs that
their pollution imposes on society pro-
vides them with an appropriate incen-
tive to reduce their own pollution.
This incentive also allows polluters
maximum flexibility in deciding how
to control pollution; consequently, it
is sometimes more cost-effective than
some other pollution control policies.
Recent analyses have emphasized
that pollution taxes can not only curb
pollution, but also fund cuts in other
levies, raising the prospect of benefits
to both the economy and the environ-
ment. Recent work on the possibility
of such a "double dividend" shows
that the relationships between tax shifts
and the performance of the economy
are intricate; they are difficult to pre-
dict and are sensitive to the distor-
tions of preexisting taxes. In particu-
lar, the potential effect on economic
efficiency of a tax shift onto pollution
is difficult to anticipate. A growing
body of research indicates that the
effect could range from a small net
reduction in efficiency to a small net
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increase, not counting the benefits of
reduced pollution (Oates 1994,
Bovenberg and Cnossen 1995, Felder
and Schleiniger 1995, Goulder 1995,
Schob 1996, Repetto and Austin 1997).
Thus, the benefits of reduced pollu-
tion can be achieved with a small
efficiency loss to the rest of the economy
or, perhaps, an even efficiency gain.
Cutting taxes on wages increases
real income and also tends to stimu-
late employment (Pearce and Turner
1990, Oates 1991, Gee 1994, Goulder
1995, Majocchi 1996). In western Eu-
rope, for example, where reducing un-
employment is a top priority, lowering
wage taxes would encourage the hir-
ing of workers. In the United States,
where unemployment rates are lower
but wages are falling for many work-
ers, tax cuts could be targeted at the
first dollars of wage income. These tax
cuts would help to reverse the trend of
declining wages for a broad cross-
section of wage earners, including the
working poor.
Some ecological taxes have already
been implemented, giving economists
sufficient experience with these taxes
to justify considering their more wide-
spread use. For example, the Montreal
Protocol of 1987 set production caps
on ozone-depleting substances, which
the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) first attempted to enforce with
a system of tradable permits. The US
Congress subsequently passed into law
a tax on chlorofluorcarbons (CFCs)
and other ozone-depleting chemicals;
this tax rises annually by $0.45 per
pound of CFC equivalent. This 1989
law is an example of a tax that has
both raised substantial revenue and
effectively controlled pollution: It has
raised several billion dollars in rev-
enue while rapidly depressing the pro-
duction of ozone-depleting chemicals
and stimulating the production of more
benign alternatives. Even with the regu-
latory caps in place, dramatic declines
in CFC production in the United States
coincided with the imposition of the
tax, strongly suggesting that it was the
tax—and not the regulatory cap—that
spurred this dramatic decline. The tax
has, moreover, curbed production of
ozone-depleting chemicals at a pace
that exceeds the more stringent 1990
Adjustments and Amendments to the
Montreal Protocol. Instead of dictat-
ing a specific means of pollution con-
trol, the tax provides an incentive for
industry to respond to market forces
to control ozone-depleting chemicals
in cost-effective ways (Hoerner 1995).
Several market-oriented approaches
to pollution control have been adopted
outside of the United States. These
approaches, especially those used in
northern Europe, reflect a growing
trend to use taxes creatively as a tool
to stimulate appropriate kinds of eco-
nomic development. The Netherlands,
for example, places a levy on indus-
trial discharges into waterways ac-
cording to biological oxygen demand
and concentrations of heavy metals in
the effluent. The levy was first devel-
oped to pay for water treatment, but it
has also encouraged more than two-
thirds of the affected industries to de-
velop private treatment processes and
dramatically reduce their effluents
(Hotte et al. 1995). These new taxes
are part of a trend throughout all of
Scandinavia of increasing reliance on
"green" taxes. Some of the new taxes
have served not as supplements to
preexisting taxes, but as partial re-
placements. In 1991, for example,
Sweden moved USS2.4 billion, or
1.9%, of its total tax base onto sulfur
dioxide and carbon dioxide emissions.
The tax on sulfur dioxide had an im-
mediate effect, with emissions falling
16% in the first year. In 1993 and
1995, Denmark enacted a suite of
ecological taxes, including ones on
carbon dioxide emissions, water use,
pesticides, and batteries (Roodman
1997).
As another example of a market-
oriented approach to pollution con-
trol, in 1993 Sweden placed a broad-
based tax on net carbon dioxide
emissions equivalent to approximately
US$75 per ton of coal. The tax has
since been raised, with certain reduc-
tions for industry. Because many fac-
tors contribute to carbon dioxide emis-
sions, attributing the problem to any
single factor is difficult. Energy taxes,
especially those on motor fuel, have
helped to stimulate energy efficiency
and the development of other sources
of fuels, and these taxes are, in part,
responsible for 25 years of declining
rates of carbon dioxide emissions in
Sweden even though industrial output
has grown (Olivecrona 1995). The
efficiency improvements in Sweden and
other countries with broad-based en-
ergy taxes strongly suggest that these
taxes are more effective at curbing
emissions than more narrow regula-
tions on individual energy-consuming
processes and products, such as those
in the United States (Von Weizsacket
and Jesinghaus 1992).
A proposal for ecological
tax reform
The following general proposal for
ecological tax reform draws on many
current concepts. It addresses the ob-
jectives of economic performance, re-
duced pollution, and tax progressivity.
This proposed ecological tax reform
would help to move the economy to-
ward natural resource efficiency, tech-
nological innovation, and new invest-
ment opportunities. The tax reform
would also spur on and give direction
to technological innovation, encour-
aging clean technologies. This stimu-
lation would, in turn, create opportu-
nities for export and help the work
force to move into emerging indus-
tries. The ecological tax reform policy
would contain provisions to ease the
burden of transition on communities
while maintaining near revenue neu-
trality. These proposed changes to the
tax structure are designed to advance
the protection of the environment while
maintaining economic efficiency and
maintaining or increasing the pro-
gressivity of the tax system.
Levy taxes on pollution (e.g., particu-
lates, carbon dioxide, ozone precur-
sors, and other noxious substances).
Taxes on carbon dioxide and other
pollutants of both air and water have
been shown to be administratively
workable and also effective at raising
revenue and curbing pollution. As a
supplement to some regulations and
as an alternative to others, these taxes
allow both industries and individuals
a broad spectrum of options to control
pollution in cost-effective ways.
Rebate this revenue to the taxpayers in
a way that would maintain a progres-
sive tax structure. For example, re-
duce payroll taxes on labor (both em-
ployee and employer contributions)
by removing payroll taxes from the
first dollars of wage income. Income
taxes are progressive in that the aver-
age tax, as a percentage of income,
rises as income rises. Consumption
taxes tend to be more regressive than
income taxes because the average tax
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rate does not necessarily rise with in-
creases in consumption. Taxes on pol-
lution are a form of consumption tax
and so tend to be more regressive than
taxes on income. Taxes related to en-
ergy use are especially regressive be-
cause people with low incomes tend to
spend disproportionately more of their
income on energy than do people with
higher incomes. A zero tax bracket on
v^ age income could be structured to
offset the regressivity of the pollution
tax or even to enhance the overall
progressivity of the tax system. Wage
earners with low incomes would thus
be protected as a class from a net
increase in taxes. As with any tax shift,
some individuals within each income
class would fare better than others,
but the overall effect would be to
preserve or increase the progressivity
of the tax structure. By easing the
payroll tax burden from the first dol-
lars of wage income, a broad class of
wage earners would benefit from the
increase in income, including those
with low incomes.
Phase the tax shift in gradually and
predictably over a number of years to
help ensure an orderly, low-cost tran-
sition. An important concern of busi-
ness and industry is to be able to
anticipate and plan for investment. A
second concern of the government is
to maintain a reasonably stable and
predictable stream of revenue from
the new taxes. Because the tax base
would shrink as less pollution is pro-
duced, the taxes could be adjusted
upward or gradually broadened over
time to make up for the lost tax rev-
enue. A phase-in period announced
well in advance would stimulate a
smooth, more efficient response to the
tax shift. A 10-year phase-in would
take advantage of some normal capi-
tal replacement and reduce the transi-
tion cost. As examples, the US ozone-
depleting chemicals tax, with its
predictable annual rise, and the Ger-
man tax on lead in gasoline, with its
10-year phase-in, have allowed indus-
try time to plan accordingly (Schnuten-
haus 1995).
As an initial step, part of the tax
burden could steadily be shifted away
from income and onto carbon diox-
ide. Although a 10-year phase-in pe-
riod would allow business and indus-
try to plan ahead, a review of economic
models by the Stanford Energy Mod-
eling Forum includes scenarios with a
50-year phase-in period. If the tax on
carbon dioxide emissions were ini-
tially set at $22.50 per ton of carbon
and raised to $250 per ton of carbon
over a 50-year period, the equivalent
tax on gasoline would rise from its
initial $0.06 per gallon to $0.69 per
gallon over that period. The models
indicate that the tax would stabilize
the carbon dioxide concentration in
the atmosphere at approximately 65%
above pre-industrial levels (John
Weyant, Stanford University, manu-
script in preparation). A revenue-neu-
tral, phased approach to a carbon
dioxide tax is increasingly popular
among those advocating ecological tax
reform (e.g.. Bach et al. 1994,
Hammond et al. 1997).
Figures from the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) put tbe magni-
tude of the tax in perspective. The
CBOestimatesthataUStaxof$19.50
per ton of carbon would raise ap-
proximately $14.3 billion in 1998
(CBO 1997). Returned to 146.6 mil-
lion workers through a reduction in
their payroll tax, the rebate would
average approximately $97.50 per
worker (Social Security Administra-
tion, Washington, DC, manuscript in
preparation). The carbon tax and cor-
responding reduction in payroll taxes
could then be scaled up over time. If
the tax were $50 per ton, the rebate
would be approximately $250 per
worker.
In addition to the potential carbon
tax, CBO estimates of potential rev-
enue from a suite of taxes on air pol-
lutants and water pollutants total
$47.4 billion in 1998. The potential
taxes on water pollutants, which coyer
biological oxygen demand and five
categories of toxic pollutants, would
yield $1.4 billion in 1998. For air
pollutants from stationary sources,
CBO estimates that taxes of $300
per ton of sulfur dioxide, $3000 per
ton of nitrogen oxides, $1900 per
ton of particulate matter, and $4000
per ton of volatile organic com-
pounds would raise $2.4 billion,
$15.2 billion, $2.2 billion, and $26.2
billion, respectively, in the first year
(CBO 1997).
Use a small fraction of the tax rev-
enue to provide transitional assis-
tance for communities, workers, and
pollution-intensive industries that are
strongly affected by the tax and to
support the development of clean
technologies. Even if the tax shift is
phased in predictably over time, some
workers would be displaced as in-
dustries shift to less polluting prac-
tices. Communities that have many
jobs in polluting industries would be
affected most strongly. This transi-
tional assistance would provide job
training and job placement, and it
would facilitate the creation of new
jobs in clean industries. It would
also accelerate the transition to a
cleaner economy.
Address the implications for interna-
tional competitiveness of those indus-
tries that are most affected by the tax.
Provisions could include international
coordination, tariff adjustments at the
border to compensate for tbe tax, re-
source efficiency investment credits,
or other mechanisms. A tax shift in
the United States would be in step
with sentiment within the European
Union and would follow a broader
international trend toward the use of
ecological taxes (Hoerner and Muller
1993). Any tax shift would have some
effect on the international competi-
tiveness of some industries. To ad-
dress this effect, a compensatory
import tariff could be levied on goods
manufactured in countries with less
stringent environmental policies. A
compensatory tax rebate on exports
would go further to ensure competi-
tiveness, but it would undermine the
effectiveness of the tax.
Conclusion
The strength of this proposal is the
immutable logic of taxing what we
would like to get rid of instead of
taxing productive activities. Transi-
tional costs and other concerns are a
part of this intricate issue of shifting
the burden of taxation. An important
component of the proposal is its near
revenue neutrality, which tends to re-
duce adverse effects on macroeconomic
performance and to preserve tax
progressivity.
The challenge of developing a work-
able tax reform package is one of
finding common ground among dis-
parate concerns. Our proposal reflects
our concerns for the environment,
jobs, income, productivity, and other
dimensions of economic perfor-
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mance. They also reflect a degree of
compromise, which is necessary to
find common ground on this intri-
cate topic.
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